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“I hold this to be the highest task of a bond between two people: that each should 
stand guard over the solitude of the other. For, if it lies in the nature of indifference 
and of the crowd to recognize no solitude, then love and friendship are there for the 
purpose of continually providing the opportunity for solitude. And only those are the 
true sharings which rhythmically interrupt periods of deep isolation.” 
 




Using Heidegger’s ontological method, I analyze how desire and love 
tend to be confounded and how love tends to be reduced to its everyday 
notions. I demonstrate this ontologically by distinguishing desire and 
love. I argue for what is constitutive to each under Heidegger’s 
philosophy; namely, that love is an authentic form of Being-with, and 
desire an inauthentic form. Both lie as extrema on the spectrum of 
positive modes of Being-with, while the ordinary conceptions of desire 
and love are mostly deficient modes of Being-with. I further show the 
way in which each can manifest under these positive modes of Being-
with, and conclude that authentic love can be understood as an 
ontological rebirth of a shared moment constituted by the entwinement 
of eros and philia. Throughout the analysis, I elucidate on Heidegger’s 
key themes, utilize Ann Carson’s accounts on eros as a framework for the 
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discussion, and bring in aspects of Rilke’s and Nietzsche’s thinking to 
facilitate the ontological analysis of love. While this analysis is not a 
complete account of the ontology of love in general, I nevertheless take it 
that Heidegger’s work can allow us to rethink some of the ordinary ways 
we confound love with notions of desire. 
 
2. Ontological Analysis of Love and Desire in General 
In Eros the Bittersweet, Anne Carson discusses the paradoxes and 
complexities of eros as erotic desire—this does not always entail sexual 
desire (in particular because of her later discussion on eros within the 
pursuit of knowledge), but sexual desire tends to be the most common 
form of eros. Carson says that desire lies between the two poles of 
“absence and presence” where “love and hate [are] its motive energies.” 
Her text displays the various ways sexual desire conveys its paradoxical 
nature.1 Carson emphasizes the notions of lacking, reaching, and the 
edginess of one’s boundaries as a person. She states, “The Greek word 
eros denotes ‘want,’ ‘lack,’ ‘desire’ for that which is missing. The lover 
wants what he does not have. It is by definition impossible for him to 
have what he wants if, as soon as it is had, it is no longer wanting.”2 
Reaching for—but never having—the other, goes hand in hand with 
lacking. 
She later argues, by way of the Phaedrus, for a more enhanced 
meaning of eros as pteros, the winged version of eros; and describes the 
complexities that this version brings about. Pteros, while carrying more 
meaning than eros, does not fit metrically in Socrates’ verse because it 
creates an issue with long and short vowel patterns. Through this, 
Socrates attempts to show, and Carson points out, the persistent conflicts 
that eros brings: if we find a way to give it more meaning, we end up 
falling short in formal structures of elucidation. Pteros is a ‘God’s 
understanding’ of eros, which we can never fully comprehend. Wanting 
to understand eros, but never being able to do so in a comprehensive 
way, is also what occurs in the desire for knowledge. The pursuit of 
knowledge parallels desire, since the quest for true knowledge always 
eludes us. Hence, the pursuit of knowledge carries its own form of eros. 
Carson defines erotic love and desire as a reaching characterized by 
ungraspability. Her project helps make sense of the complexities and 
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conflicting nature of eros as such. In this paper, I aim to further her 
project by ontologically analyzing the distinctions between love as pteros 
and desire as eros under Heidegger’s framework. Certain aspects of eros 
under Carson’s account, if viewed through a Heideggerian ontological 
lens, would fall under inauthentic positive modes of Being-with, and 
other aspects of it would better be understood as authentic positive 
modes of Being-with, which I distinguish as love.3 If we take Heidegger’s 
proposals of Dasein’s care structure seriously, we find a conflation 
between desire and love in our general understanding of intimate care for 
another person that is not solely friendly nor familial. Thus, I will argue 
that love, as an authentic mode of Being-with, involves a longing-for that 
is distinct from desire’s tormented reaching, and is constituted by 
belonging. Love’s features of longing and belonging will be distinguished 
from desire’s features of ‘urge’ and ‘penchant.’ I will further suggest that 
this authentic love is something like an interweaving of eros and philia, 
the other ancient Greek word for love. This interweaving, along with an 
analysis of love’s ‘falling’ character, will lead us to the final section of 
love’s rebirth. Prior to all this, however, I will expound on Heidegger’s 
ontological project of Dasein to frame the context of my argument. 
Importantly, while it is customary to understand desire as sexual 
attraction and want of another in general, in this paper I am 
approaching desire and love through a Heideggerian ontological lens, 
wherein desire is a particular form of attraction to another. As such, it 
has certain defining features that characteristically place it as an 
inauthentic mode of Being-with. These features are what Heidegger calls 
‘urge’ and ‘penchant.’ They are directed towards something other in 
order to grasp it and take it over. Desire is potentially dominating, but it 
doesn’t always, nor explicitly, manifest in this way. Hence, desire does 
not necessarily have to be physically based. There is also non-physical 
desire for another.4 These physical and non-physical desires can manifest 
sexually, but not in all cases. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the 
variations of physical and non-physical desire as simply desire. 5 
Moreover, in what ensues, I want to make it clear that sexual intercourse 
and sexuality are not what is being discussed nor criticized here, but 
rather, the ‘state-of-mind’ that one is in when under the pull of desire or 
love. In other words, what is being analyzed is one’s existential 
Women in Philosophy Journal  
 
 34 
understanding and comportment when inundated by these moods. 
Moreover, sexual actions can occur within a variety of moods which do 
not necessarily imply a state of desire nor one of love; they can occur 
under many different moods, for example, fear, indifference, friendliness, 
or admiration. The variations of possible moods pertaining to sexual 
actions is outside the scope of this paper. 
 
3. The Ontological Project Concerning Dasein 
Preliminarily, we must first clarify what Heidegger means by an 
ontological account of Being as opposed to an ontic one, Dasein and its 
care structure, and the modes of Being that Dasein can take on. These 
elements are important for the subsequent analysis of desire and love. 
Something being ontical is simply what is in being. That is, the 
phenomenon in being, which includes all the ready-to-hand and present-
at-hand entities; the extant entities that we treat as equipment or as 
objective entities before us for study and contemplation. Dasein, that 
Being which is in each case is ‘my own,’ is also ontical insofar as it is 
Being. What is ontical is characterized in existentiell terms. These are 
concrete ways of Being and how we usually describe ourselves. Ontic 
inquiry is the general and varying ways in which we try to make sense of 
our being. The understanding of oneself, which leads along this way of 
trying to make sense of our existence as existentiell, is an ontical affair. 
We all are concerned about our Being. No theoretical transparency in 
ontical inquiry is required in order to pose questions such as that of “To 
be or not to be” in Shakespeare. Of course, that is not to undermine 
these existentiell ways of inquiry, as they nevertheless take tremendous 
effort and thought. Ontical inquiry can be captured descriptively or by 
the usual ways of thinking about our lives such as, questioning what sort 
of sense I should give my life. Ontical normative questions are tied to 
who we are when we are thrown into this life. 
The ontological perspective, on the other hand, is trying to make us 
aware of what makes ontic understanding—the ability to question our 
lives and think of our being—possible. It is an endeavor to get clear of 
the conditions of possibilities that push further than what has been done 
in ontic inquiry. Trying to work out ontologically what makes the ontic 
realm possible must begin with an open mind that is guided by a certain 
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question, namely, the question of the meaning of Being. In being guided 
by this question different horizons will open up. Whatever is opened up 
will reflect back to our question and will develop itself. This means that it 
cannot be understood in the sense of grasping an answer. Conditions of 
possibilities are to be worked out and will change by way of the 
ontological inquiry itself. Ordinarily, we think we understand Being, and 
tend to be fixated on getting answers as if they are something objective in 
themselves. Through his methods, Heidegger tries to have us get the 
hang of a certain kind of questioning, a kind of investigating, that does 
not rest on any kind of graspable answer. If we deal with the conditions 
of possibilities of our very understanding there is no answer we can get in 
this sense of a concrete objective fact. In order to get us to see this, 
Heidegger needs to clear the way of all the presuppositions and common 
notions that hinder us from understanding the process of ontological 
inquiry.  
What is ontological is characterized in existential terms. Existentiality 
singles out the possibility of Being that is exclusive to Dasein. Any kind of 
existential analysis has to begin with how we are most of the time in our 
everyday lives. Hence, ontological inquiry is based on Dasein’s ontic 
constitution. All ontic entities (things, equipment, animals, Dasein as an 
entity), have their way of Being which can be explained in the ontological 
perspective. This makes sense of Heidegger’s common phrase, ‘the Being 
of beings.’ Where the lower case beings refer to entities which are 
present-at-hand or ready-to-hand, the upper cased Being refers to the 
ontological understanding of them, namely, the how of entities. Under 
Heidegger’s analysis, ontological interpretation is difficult to enact not 
because of intellectual capacities or IQ levels, etc. It is difficult because of 
the very nature of Dasein, as ahead-of-itself, as Being-in-the-World, and 
as Being-alongside, is constantly falling back into everyday concernful 
ways of Being. This is not a negative thing per se; rather, the task of 
analyzing our existential Being will not come so easily, but will require 
much effort. An ontological interpretation of Dasein must consistently 
fight from falling, and consequently, from interpreting Dasein at the 
ontic level. 
Heidegger’s notion of Dasein, which can be translated directly as 
‘being there,’ or ‘the being that is there,’ refers to we ourselves. More 
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precisely, Heidegger means to refer to the Being of that specific kind of 
being that we ourselves are. In the first paragraph of the opening chapter 
of Being and Time, Dasein is characterized in four ways: (1) Dasein is the 
Being that is in each case mine; (2) In its Being (the ‘how’ of its being), 
this being comports itself towards its Being; (3) As an entity with this 
Being, it is delivered over to its own Being; (4) it is that Being which is an 
issue for it—its “that it is” is an issue for it.6 
Dasein cannot have the kind of Being that belongs to something 
present-at-hand, which are entities that can be presented thematically.7 
Dasein is Being there and cannot be reduced to a present-at-hand object, 
even though science (biology and psychology, for example) can thematize 
Dasein and thus view it through the particular lens of the present-at-
hand. While factual, this thematic conception of Dasein is only partial 
and reductive of its Being under existential terms. That Dasein is its 
‘there’ means that it is grounded in disclosedness. Disclosure of the 
‘there’ is disclosure of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. This means that “the 
world, Being-in, and the Self, which, as an ‘I am,’—is disclosed with 
equal primordiality.”8 When a world is disclosed, so are the entities 
within it that are ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. Disclosure is a 
differentiation, which lets entities be seen in their own Being, from the 
undifferentiated character of everydayness, which takes things as mere 
objects for use or examination without heed to the thing itself in its 
Being. For Heidegger, the traditional models of truth as an assertion 
(judgement), or truth as an agreement (correspondence), do not get to the 
more primordial relationship that truth has with Being. In ¶44 of Being 
and Time, Heidegger shows, by way of Aristotle and Parmenides, that 
truth as ἀλήθεια (aletheia), Being, and the thing that shows itself all 
belong together.9 When ontologically understood, ἀλήθεια, he argues, is 
Being-true and this means “taking entities out of their hiddenness and 
letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness).” 
Ἀλήθεια, connected to “the things themselves,” means “entities in the 
‘how’ of their uncoveredness.”10 Thus Being-true is Being-uncovered. All 
uncovering of entities (including scientific discovery, and theoretical 
reflection) is grounded in “the world’s disclosedness.”11 Disclosedness, the 
Being of the there, is constituted by the fundamental existentialia of 
understanding, state-of-mind, and falling. These three are existential 
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characteristics of Dasein. Hence, Dasein as Being-there is the truth of its 
existence as the how of its uncoveredness, opened up by these three 
existentialia. 
Moreover, because Dasein is singled out as existence—only Dasein 
can exist (i.e. no animal, thing, or equipment can exist in the sense of 
Dasein’s existence). There are of course other entities there, in Being. 
Heidegger doesn’t deny this. He is, however, focusing on Dasein’s Being 
and therefore reserves existence exclusively to Dasein’s kind of Being 
there. This is a terminological distinction, useful for the purpose of 
understanding how Dasien is distinct from all other beings and ways of 
Being. Things are important in this discourse insofar as they make sense 
of how it is that we comport ourselves as entities in the world and how we 
are in-the-world. The word ‘existence,’ from the Latin prefix ex- and the 
verb stare, literally, means to stand out. Existence, in Heidegger’s sense, is 
a kind of standing outside of one’s ordinary conception of self. It is also 
linked to temporality via the Greek ἐκστατικον, which will not be 
discussed here. 12 
To ontologically clarify the analytic of Dasein as Being ‘there,’ 
Heidegger shows that the structures which are characteristic of Dasein’s 
Being—existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen—are primordially woven 
together in the unity of care. Dasein’s care structure can be summed up 
by the formula: “ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the world) as Being-
alongside (entities encountered in within-the-world).”13 
The first part, Being-ahead-of-itself, means that Dasein is constantly 
projecting upon its possibilities, that is, it is “Being towards its own most 
potentiality-for-Being.”14 In German, as in English, projection as Entwurf 
has a double meaning: Entwerfen, to project, means to design as well as to 
throw…out of. Thus, projection and possibilities go together in the sense 
that Dasein is itself a project for itself that is constantly ahead-of-itself in 
the way that a project is constantly a process of becoming. Dasein thus 
exists; as Being-ahead-of-itself it stands outside of itself. Dasein does not 
realize itself as actual, which would reduce it to an ontic present-at-hand 
understanding; rather, it is always its possibilities as such. Dasein, 
therefore, is never the kind of being that is isolated and in itself, as it is for 
Descartes’ ego. Dasein can project itself upon its potentiality 
authentically by ‘choosing itself,’ inauthentically by ‘fleeing from itself,’ 
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and by falling back to its everydayness. In everydayness Dasein’s 
possibilities are “leveled off” to what is at its disposal, and thus, its 
possibilities are tranquilized with what is “merely actual.” Nevertheless, 
authentic Being towards possibilities (Being-ahead-of-itself) is not 
destroyed but can remain manifest in “mere wishing.” Wishing is 
inauthentic insofar as Dasein misunderstands its factical possibilities. 
Facticity pertains to the second part of the formula, Being-already-in-
(the-world). 
Being-ahead-of-itself is not contained within an isolated nor 
worldless subject, but rather, co-occurs with Being-in-the-world. Dasein 
is delivered over to its ‘there’ and thus is “thrown into a world.”15 Being-
in is an existential state of Dasein and is not the kind of being in of a fish 
being in the ocean. Heidegger shows how in comes from innan, which is 
‘to reside’ or ‘to dwell’ and that ‘I am,’ the German ich bin, means ‘I 
dwell.’ ‘Being’ (as the infinitive of ‘I am’) is ‘to reside alongside’ or ‘to be 
familiar with.’16  Thus, Being-in is how Dasein is. The world is a 
characteristic of Dasein, which in everydayness gets understood as its 
‘environment.’ For the sake of being concise, we won’t undergo a study 
of ‘the worldhood of the world,’ which Heidegger goes to great lengths in 
order to expound. It is sufficient to understand that, ontologically, only 
Dasein has a world, insofar as it exists. Being-in-the-world and Being-
ahead-of-itself is the unitary characteristic of care as thrown-projection. 
That is, Dasein is thrown from out of itself to its possibilities. 
Being-ahead-of-itself-already-in-the-world is always alongside 
entities within the world. Entities include those characterized 
phenomenally as ready-to-hand, as well as other Daseins with which 
Dasein shares the world. Dasein as Being-with means that it is absorbed 
in the world of its concern and falls alongside entities within it. Being-with 
is irreducible and autonomous to Dasein’s factical existence. 
Primordially, care (the German sorge) manifests as concern (besorgen) with 
regards to Being-alongside the ready-to-hand environmentally, and as 
solicitude (fürsorge) with regards to other Daseins.17 Solicitude is a “factical 
social arrangement” and constitutes how we are with others in the 
world.18 Solicitude is important for the analysis of Being-with in desire 
and love. 
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Finally, authenticity and inauthenticity are irreducible modes of 
Dasein’s Being, which “are grounded in the fact that any Dasein 
whatsoever is characterized by mineness.”19 That these are modes of its 
Being, means that they cannot be understood by way of some other 
thing; they are a priori to any understanding of existence. Only the 
particular Dasein decides its existence, either by taking hold of it, or by 
neglecting it. This gets decided through existence itself. Dasein is 
authentic when it ‘choses itself’ and inauthentic when it ‘flees in the face 
of its Being,’ and thus forgets itself. Both of these give Dasein a definite 
character. Whereas average everydayness gives it its undifferentiated 
character. Everydayness is the mode of Being that Dasein is ‘proximally 
and for the most part.’ Having an undifferentiated character means 
Dasein is not really ‘anywhere,’ because it is not ‘in’ any mode of Being, 
that is, it is not definite, and thus has no characteristics of its own, but 
only those of the ‘they’—that is ‘Das Man,’ or ‘The One’ or ‘Anyone.’ 
Everydayness is characterized by “the comfortableness of the 
accustomed…That which will come tomorrow (and this is what everyday 
concern keeps awaiting) is ‘eternally yesterday’s.’ In everydayness 
everything is all one and the same, but whatever the day may bring it is 
taken as diversification.”20 In everydayness we seek new ways to alleviate 
the “dull suffering” and sinking away in the dullness of it. Thus, in 
everydayness, along with the habitual day-to-day mannerisms and 
expected ways of living, there is a hankering after the new and the 
eventful, the excitable, and the lively experiences. Dasein is always 
searching for the next thing to keep it interested. 
It is important to note, as Heidegger does, that inauthenticity and 
everydayness, are not “any less or any lower degree of Being” than 
authenticity; “even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be characterized 
by inauthenticity—when busy, when excited, when interested, when 
ready for enjoyment.”21 Inauthenticity means having one’s own Being in 
view, standing in the face of one’s Being, but not choosing one’s Self, and 
instead fleeing from it; thus existing as the undifferentiated ‘they’ self 
encountered in everydayness. Even if authentic “existence can gain 
mastery over the everyday… it can never extinguish it.”22 Dasein cannot 
permanently be in the authentic mode, nor can it always be in the 
everyday inauthentic way. The very nature of Dasein, as an entity who’s 
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Being is an issue for it, means that within the moments and intervals of its 
everydayness, it comes back to its authentic Being, just as much as it falls 
back into its everyday customs and ways of understanding itself. These 
modes of Dasein’s Being are very much linked together, and characterize 
the ‘how’ of Dasein’s comportment to its Being and in its Being. With 
regards to love and desire, characterizing them respectively, as authentic 
and inauthentic forms of Dasein’s potential for Being-with refers to 
Dasein’s ontological constitution. There is no essential hierarchy between 
them since they involve one another. In a way, Dasein shifts between 
these modes and everydayness. Our Being-with another in love or desire 
involves these three modes; authentic Being-with which can manifest as 
love, inauthentic Being-with which can manifest as desire, and the 
average everyday way of Being-with which can manifest as indifference 
to the other.23 
 
4. Modes of Being-with: in-Desire and in-Love 
Dasein is always Being-with others in-the-world. Existing as Being-with 
others is not the same as existing as Being-alongside the ready-to-hand 
entities. Dasein comports itself to other Daseins, as Being-with, by way of 
solicitude (fürsorge), which is related to care (sorge). Most of the time, 
solicitude falls under deficient modes of Being-with, which manifests as 
the different ways of how we are with one another in everydayness. The 
positive modes of Being-with take on two extreme possibilities, which, as 
extrema, span a range of “positive” comportments. These are Leaping-in 
and Leaping-ahead. Leaping-in (or standing in for) places oneself in 
another’s concern and takes away her own Being as ‘care.’ This can 
manifest as making the other dependent or dominated but does not 
necessarily come out explicitly as such. Leaping-ahead, on the other 
hand, liberates the other by helping her gain a sense of herself as Being, 
existentially, care, and thus opens up the paths for her “to become free 
for it [her Being].”24 The analysis of desire and love is a complicated one 
because it is not very clear where each falls, that is, on which mode of the 
extema spectrum; this is especially so because in each case it can vary for 
the different circumstances surrounding lovers. For the sake of 
determining an authentic form of love that is freeing and helping the 
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other, we can say authentic love tends towards a leaping-ahead and 
desire tends more towards a leaping-in. 
Being-with, as the spectrum of positive and deficient modes, 
circumscribes the possible ways in which lovers can comport with and 
towards one another. Thus, even a pair held together by mostly leaping-
in behaviors have the potential for being held together by leaping-ahead 
behaviors, and vice-versa. Likewise, those comporting under deficient 
modes, namely indifference, who are not really held at all, also have the 
potential for positive modes of Being-with one another. We can choose 
the modes we stand in depending on the situation and the stakes. What is 
most common amongst non-indifferent individuals is something of a mix 
of positive modes, with neither extrema fully undergone. A full 
understanding of one’s own Being-with requires that one pay heed to 
both extrema. The dominating form as the contrast to the liberating 
form grants a sense of where one stands in relation to another, and can 
open up the possibility of Being-with manifested as authentic love. 
Desire as a positive mode of Being-with is a yearning to have the 
beloved. Dasein in desire is nevertheless aware that it cannot take over 
what it wants to possess. This awareness is primarily motived by a notion 
of being an individual subject separate from the objective world, which 
includes the other to which desire gets orientated by. For desire to 
remain, Dasein takes its object of desire as ungraspable. If it has the 
other, it no longer desires them. Understanding itself as an isolated 
subject, bound-off from the other, Dasein can keep within desire, since 
desire involves sensing one’s limits as an individual subject. Physically 
and understandingly, Dasein is tormented by its separation from the 
other and the lack encountered in this separation. Interaction with the 
other, as an effect of this tormented lack, will be in relation to one’s own 
understanding of oneself as an entity in need of becoming ‘completed.’ 
This form of relating to the other converts the beloved into a present-at-
hand object that Dasein takes as able to fill its ‘void.’ As an object of 
Dasein’s desire, the other or the beloved is obfuscated and turned into 
idealizations of Dasein’s self fulfillment. The beloved gets covered up by 
the divide spawned from a conceived subjective isolation and is morphed 
into an object ordained to serve the self-completion of the lover. The 
lover’s desire is motivated to act against the liberation of the beloved by 
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the very torment of its own paradox— of having a stirring sensation that 
is impulsive towards the other yet unsatisfactorily contained within 
oneself, of reaching but never having. This paradox leads Dasein to 
become perplexed about understanding itself as a subject; perplexed, 
Dasein has the potential to encounter a kind of gateway to authentic 
comportment. Most of the time, however, it gets caught up in the 
torment of the perplexity instead of seeing it through. 
Carson expresses how loving and hating the object of one’s desire is 
part of what occurs in desire. Desire is the in between of love and hate 
because it relies on these two poles to keep it in that penchant state of 
lacking. In making the other a present-at-hand object, the other is 
unattainable because the lover can only see the other as always separate 
and present-at-hand. Given the way in which desire blinds the lover from 
authentic forms of Being-with, it is not primarily motivated by the lover’s 
beloved, but by its intoxicating nature as such. Desire awakens in the 
lover a sense of livelihood and excitement in her otherwise dreary 
everyday life, characterized by indifference and leveled off ways of Being-
with others. In desire, the lover’s sense of a lack hints at the lack-of-
fullness in everydayness, but the lover misunderstands this as a lack of 
having the other. Thus, in reaching for her beloved, Dasein gains a sense 
of livelihood—something exciting and distinct from the surface-level 
existence of the day to day. Desire is a kind of intoxication which needs 
the reaching and never-reached in-between to continuously return to the 
sensation of exciting desire itself. For this reason, the lover never fully 
hates nor fully loves the other—but keeps her between these poles. 
Therefore, it is the very sense of reaching the other, and not the other as 
another Dasein, that the lover truly craves. Likewise, it is her sense of not 
ever grasping the beloved that the lover hates. This is so even in the 
torment of lack. The torment itself is part of the excitement that desire 
awakens in Dasein’s leveled-off existence. The lack allows for a reach, a 
potential more than the everyday. It is in this way of craving desire that it 
becomes the lover’s penchant, and it is in the way of taking the other as 
an object for the lover, that desire is exhibited as an urge. 
The tranquilizing effect that everydayness has on Dasein blinds it 
from its possibilities. By falling prey to the they, Dasein has a tranquilized 
willing which is a modification of authentic Being-towards one’s 
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potentiality-for-Being. This tranquilized way of Being towards 
possibilities manifests as wishing. In wishing, Dasein’s projection never 
takes hold of its possibilities as such, nor ever carefully considers their 
fulfillment. Being-ahead-of-itself dominates and does not understand 
factical possibilities. That is, “wishing is an existential modification of 
projecting oneself understandingly, when such self-projection has fallen 
forfeit to thrownness and just keeps hankering after possibilities.” 
Hankering “closes off the possibilities.”25 This hankering is driven by the 
penchant [addiction] for lively experiences in Dasein’s world. The 
penchant for experiences of feeling alive blinds Dasein in such a way that 
all its possibilities serve what it is addicted to. In the penchant for the 
experience of desire, which makes its everydayness more lively, Dasein 
gets closed off from its potentiality-for-Being and constantly only 
confronts the possibilities of Being-with in the mode of leaping-in. In a 
penchant, care is bound. On the other hand, in an urge, care “has not 
yet become free.” This is because the urge to live or feel alive in the 
averageness of the everyday is an impulse to live at any price. In this 
inauthentic Being-ahead, urge leaves no room for other possibilities to 
arise and can outrun the situation that Dasein finds itself in.26 Thus in 
desire as an urge, Dasein does not hold the situation but runs past it for 
the sake of desire’s liveliness, and thus, crowds out all possibilities of 
authentic sharing in Being there. In the wish-world of a Dasein caught 
up in lively experiences themselves, such as desire, the hankering after 
possibilities binds care and does not set it free. Hence, the possibility of 
Being-with, under the mode of Leaping-ahead, becomes closed off. 
Carson expresses that the paradox of the lover caught up in eros, occurs 
as an “arrest” which confounds the lover’s reality, a reality that 
disappears “into the possibility of what we could be if we were other than 
we are.”27 Desire’s perplexity, if paid heed to without the disposition to 
solve its enigmatical qualities and its hint of the more, can lead Dasein 
from out of its urge and penchant for desire into a genuine Being-with in-
love that leaps-ahead. 
 Authentic Being-in-love does not leap-in as desire does. It steadies, 
or settles, itself in the equiprimordiality of one’s own most Dasein as null 
and as constitutive of mineness (essentially bounded by one’s ownmost) 
and simultaneously, as essentially Being-with the other as Being-alongside. 
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That is to say, it does not take over the other, but instead, lets them Be 
what they already are as their ownmost potentiality. Authentic Dasein 
understands that it can only ever desire the other because its very Being 
means Being-with others that are also their ownmost potentiality-for-
Being. In love, the other is authentically understood as a Dasein to which 
the lover longs for, but does not wish to grasp them in the sense of a 
present-at-hand object. Longing for, I will argue, is a distinct way of 
Being-towards the other that is not the same kind as desire’s reaching 
that is founded upon urge and penchant. Love, as a kind of longing and 
Belonging, is neither tormenting nor lively in the sense of an amusement. 
Love will be shown to be liberating and a condition for the possibility of 
rebirth. Prior to this, I will first clarify what is meant by Dasein’s nullity 
and the notion of anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein’s authentic projection 
towards its possibilities. These are two features of Dasein that are 
essential for understanding any authentic comportment. 
 
5. Nullity 
One of the important structures of Dasein, which reveals its care 
structure as essentially null, is Being-guilty. Heidegger aims to clarify the 
primordial ontological meaning of Being-guilty by first rejecting the 
common understandings of guilt as having debts, being responsible for, 
or coming to owe something to others.28 To owe something to others is 
based off of Being the reason for a lack of something in another, and 
similarly, having a lack due to a failure to satisfy duties or requirements 
to others. To define guilt under a lack, Heidegger argues, is to consider 
Dasein as present-at-hand because something (which can go missing) has 
gone missing, and that means not-Being-present-at-hand—what should 
be present is not. Being-guilty, as a phenomena, does not first arise from 
an indebtedness in the sense of lack, but from the more original character 
of the ‘not,’ through which something can even come to be understood 
as lacking in the first place. From this, Heidegger argues that Being-guilty 
means “being-the-basis of a nullity.” The ordinary understanding of 
guilty as having responsibility for, is, ontologically, Being-the-basis-for, 
that is, Being-the-reason/ground-for, “a Being which has been defined 
by a not.”29 Dasein as care is thrown-projection. This essentially means it 
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is constituted by Being-guilty. In both its thrownness and its projection, 
Dasein confronts a nullity.  
As an entity that has been thrown into the world, Dasein is delivered 
over into its ‘there,’ but not out of its own choosing nor willing. Being-
thrown isn’t any one-time event that occurs prior to its being ‘there.’ 
Dasein is in each case thrown in its very Being, and thus “constantly lags 
behind its possibilities.” Being a basis means “existing as thrown,” and as 
such, it means“never to have power over its ownmost Being from the 
ground up.” In existing, Dasein is the basis for its potentiality-for-Being, 
and “although it has not laid the basis itself, it reposes in the weight of it.” 
Having been thrown, Dasein must now be the ground, or the reason, for 
its own Being. Yet, because it never got to choose this sort of 
responsibility towards itself, nor will ever have that control over its 
thrownness, it always carries the weight of the ‘not mine,’ that is, the 
weight of accident. It never ‘has a reason’ for why it must now ‘Be the 
reason,’ that is, it never “takes over Being-a-basis” for itself.30 Being-a-
basis is itself a nullity.  
Dasein is also a projection. As Being-ahead-of-itself, Dasein 
understands itself in terms of its possibilities that is projected. But since 
Dasein can only ever stand in one possibility or another, it is “constantly 
not other possibilities… [thus] projection itself is essentially null.”31 In 
choosing possibilities open to it, Dasein is also constantly not-choosing 
others, and so it is surrounded by all the possibilities that it did not 
choose. Thus, projection is pervaded by nullity, and is itself null. 
Being-guilty as ‘Being-the-basis of a nullity’ is the very thrown-
projection which constitutes Dasein’s structure as care. A structure 
“permeated with nullity through and through.”32 Authentically, Dasein 
takes hold of Being-guilty, inauthentically it avoids this at all costs. 
Taking a stand within possibility doesn’t mean having some goal and 
making it tangible and accessible. Rather, it signifies that sense of 
existence as outwardly standing and gaining a distance to one’s everyday 
comportment, that is, Being as thrown-projection, which ultimately 
means Being-guilty. In not choosing to heed this distance, Dasein is 
inauthentic and falls back to everydayness, thus forgetting its null 
essence.  
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6. Anticipatory Resoluteness  
The meaning of choosing to stand within one’s possibility can be 
understood through anticipatory resoluteness; its upshot is gaining 
primordial self-standing. The authenticity of care, that is, authentic 
Dasein, is characterized by anticipatory resoluteness. Resolute in 
German is entschlossen. Broken up, ent-schlossen is something like ‘un-
locked’ or a kind of removal from becoming closed. Resoluteness is a 
“letting oneself be called forth to one’s own most Being-guilty.”33 It is a 
“reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty’’ and this 
means having one’s essential nullity, as care, in view—that is, disclosed.34 
Resoluteness is distinctively an authentic Being-one’s-Self because it is 
the disclosure of one’s Self as Being-a-basis of a nullity which brings 
Dasein back to itself from its lostness in the everyday. 
Anticipation in German is vorlaufen, and anticipatory is vorlaufenden. 
The prefix ‘vor’ signifies ‘forward’ or ‘ahead of,’ and laufen is ‘to run’ or 
‘to move,’ while laufend is ‘ongoing.’ Hence, being anticipatory means 
something like being ‘an ongoing forward movement,’ or ‘a running 
ahead.’ As running ahead, anticipation is the possibility of authentic 
resoluteness. In being forward moving, anticipation is the possibility of 
the utmost certain possibility: death. Death is Dasein’s certain possibility 
of its impossibility and is thus essentially indefinite in the sense that death 
means that Dasein will not be in any mode of Being (authentic nor 
inauthentic) insofar as it is no longer existing. 
Unified, anticipatory resoluteness makes manifest the thrownness of 
Dasein “into the indefiniteness of its limit-Situation.” This means that 
Dasein is bounded by its original thrownness of birth and its ultimate 
possibility of Death; “when resolved upon the latter, Dasein gains its 
potentiality-for-Being-a-whole.”35 Anticipatory resoluteness is authentic 
Dasein as the disclosedness that is towards its possibilities, death being 
one of them. As such, Dasein is open for its potentiality-for-Being. 
Anticipatory resoluteness “frees for death the possibility of acquiring 
power over Dasein’s existence…it brings one without Illusions into the 
resoluteness of ‘taking action.”36 Here, taking action does not mean that 
a free subject wills something or other, rather, taking action is a 
releasement that has overcome this modern subjectivist position. One’s 
decisions informs one’s Being and makes manifest the nullity pervading 
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projection of one possibility and decisively not-Being other possibilities. 
The ‘decision’ of ‘taking action’ by the authentically understanding Self 
means that ‘letting act’ is a response to ‘the Situation’ that has been 
disclosed for and by way of Dasein’s existence. Dasein’s authentic 
Situation is, briefly put, the present moment, the ‘blink of an eye,’ that is 
ecstatically ‘held’ and thus opened up by the co-happening of the ‘has 
been’ and the ‘to come’ of the past and future. This must be further 
elaborated by Heidegger’s temporality, which is another paper in itself. It 
suffices for our purposes to understand, although generally, that Dasein's 
situation is no ‘event’ which can be recorded, but an existential moment 
that carries no ordinary sense of the linear homogenous time we use on a 
day to day basis. An existential moment can be however long or short 
when understood through linear time, but it carries no standard measure 
inherent in itself. 
 
7. Boundaries and Belonging 
In Carson’s account, the lover is at “at the edge of eros.” The lover sees 
their own boundaries but is unable to transgress them in order to unite 
with the beloved. In this boundedness, “the presence of want awakens in 
him nostalgia for wholeness. His thoughts turn toward questions of 
personal identity: he must recover and reincorporate what is gone if he is 
to be a complete person.”37 Carson shows that the way in which literary 
training has developed has influenced the outlook of oneself as bounded, 
and thus effects the way in which eros is experienced. For the lyric poets, 
“love is something that assaults or invades the body of the lover to wrest 
control of it from him.”38 The boundedness of the person in love is an 
important feature of love, as is the interpretation about this very 
boundedness. 
Boundaries, or the ancient greek πέρας (peras), according to 
Heidegger’s later work, is not where a thing or place ends, but where it 
begins to be what it is.39 A peras allows something to come about as its 
own. It holds an entity together and so grants it the possibility of its 
Being.40 The peras of a lecture hall, of a kitchen, or a playground, for 
example, are not necessarily their physical boarders, but what gathers it 
together as that space and frees it to Be that space. The entities within a 
space play an important role in the formation of it as that space, as does 
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the social context and time period that give meaning to a space. These 
are ways in which a peras can form around the entirety of a space’s Being 
‘there.’ The space created allows for dwelling and Being in a certain 
comportment.  
Dasein’s boundaries, understood onticly, are its physical-biological 
boundaries, its historical context, and its circumstances as a person in a 
shared world. Ontologically, its peras is its birth and its death which bind 
and hold together Dasein’s existence in its entirety. Dasein’s birth and 
death signify its way of Being as thrown-projection. Thrown into the 
world in birth, it projects upon its possibilities, one of which is its ultimate 
possibility of death. Dasein, however is in each case a thrown-projection. 
Throughout its existence, Dasein is always encountering its thrownness 
and possibilities that it can project upon. Ontological boundedness thus 
illuminates Dasein’s nullity as understood by way of anticipatory 
resoluteness’ self-projecting upon one’s Being-guilty. Being, constituted 
by a nullity, “does not detach Dasein from its world nor isolate it as a 
free-floating ‘I.’ And how should it?, when resoluteness as authentic 
disclosedness is nothing else than Being-in-the-world? Resoluteness 
brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is 
ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with others…Only by 
authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically 
be with one another—not by ambiguous and jealous stipulations and 
talkative fraternizing of the ‘they’ and in what ‘they’ want to 
undertake.”41 
Ontology inquires into what makes the ontic realm possible. Hence, 
Dasein’s ontic boundaries are not of secondary importance to what 
makes it fully itself. Its birth and death are paid special attention to in its 
ontological understanding because they are what grant Dasein the 
possibility of any ontic circumstances that determine its life. Ultimately, 
heeding these boundaries brings Dasein right back to Being in the world 
alongside others in a new way that is not leveled off and indifferent of its 
existence. 
Being one’s ownmost nullity is a belonging to oneself as bounded in 
one’s birth and death. In love, two Daseins, as null in their essence, hold 
each other in their belonging. Each always belongs to its own. Together 
they each find their belonging as their ownmost nullities. It is in this sense 
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of holding one another, and not fusing together, that Being-with each 
other in-love gains meaning as belonging together. Rainer Maria Rilke, 
in his 7th of the Letters to a Young Poet rightfully said, “Love consists of this: 
two solitudes that protect and border and greet each other.”42 Each 
belongs to its own solitude, its own boundedness as a thrown-projection; 
and with that, its potentiality-for-Being is always its own.43 Yet, in Being-
with one another and in seeing, as disclosure, the other as other, in their 
wholeness, each also can see itself as its Self, and so together can find their 
belonging to their self. In the immense distance of Being-with, as 
solitudes, Dasein finds that it belongs only truly to itself. Insofar as the 
other lets it find itself, and does not delude nor take over the other, 
equiprimordially, it also belongs to the other in authentic Being-with. 
The notion of leaping-ahead, which liberates the other to Be itself in its 
wholeness and helps it to develop as its own, is how love brings one to 
their own through the other in a shared realm. This contrasts to a notion 
of love that is one of unification with the other. The ideology of 
unification confounds and blinds Dasein’s ability to take hold of itself in 
its own boundedness. 
The notion of to belong or something belonging to something, 
means ‘rightfully,’ or fittingly, ‘being in place.’ It also carries the meaning 
of ‘to be the concern, interest, or business of.’ Belong, in Middle Dutch 
and Middle High German, belanc, belang, also had the meaning of 
‘longing,’ or ‘interest for.’44 ‘Long’ itself derives from the ancient greek 
δολιχός, which had multiple uses such as to denote a long race, or merely 
the adjective long (e.g. long neck, long spear), but it also meant making 
long journeys.45 To Be-long thus carries a sense of distance, and a 
journeying through an expanse. To be ‘in’ the ‘long’ for the other is a 
kind of movement that is always towards the other, and never at the 
other. Longing, as a kind of yearning, coincides to some degree with 
desire as a reaching that constantly never has. The sense in which desire 
as reaching does not fit with Belonging is in the way that desire is 
‘tormented’ by this never-having. It never settles within the longing as 
that immense distance between solitudes as such. The reach and torment 
of desire focuses only on getting to an end, and that it never actually gets 
to its goal. Thus, it never takes hold of the journey itself as an 
undergoing. In considering having its object as a kind of end, reaching is 
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always painfully a lack.46 Moreover, once the lover in desire thinks it has 
the other, it ceases to Be in the disclosure of the immense distance to the 
other and has effectively reduced the other to something present-at-hand.  
Belonging-to the other ontologically, is a kind of Being ‘in the long 
run’ for which has the sense of an unceasing reach, and thus, there is a 
standing within that distance to each other. Indeed, it is precisely a 
distance gained in love that allows Dasein to project upon its Self, 
alongside with the other. It is precisely the distance gained away from the 
ontic understanding of oneself that allows for a sudden hint, if not a 
complete exposition, of the ontological understanding of one’s existence. 
Rilke also beautifully captures this notion of solitudes belonging in 
infinite distance to each other in his letter to Emanuel von Bodman. 
 
 
The question of marriage, to my feeling, is not to create a quick 
commonality of spirit by tearing down all boundaries; but 
rather, a good marriage is one in which each partner appoints 
the other to be the guardian of his solitude, and thus they show 
each other the greatest possible trust. A merging of two people 
is an impossibility, and where it seems to exist, it is a hemming-
in [narrowing], a mutual consent that robs one party or both 
parties of their fullest freedom and development. But once the 
realization is accepted that even between the closest people 
infinite distances exist, a wonderful living side-by-side can grow 
up, if they succeed in loving the expanse [distance] between 
them, which gives them the possibility of always seeing each 
other as a whole and before an immense [wide] sky.47 
 
 
The immense sky not only captures the great distance that resides 
between lovers, but also the heights of this love. While love, rightfully, 
tends to be characterized as ‘falling-in,’ ‘deep,’ and ‘all consuming,’ it 
also carries a sense of height, and thus, of flight. Indeed, Carson’s 
account of pteros does carry more meaning than eros. The depths of the 
chasm that exists between lovers is also the height of its infinite expanse. 
Falling in love is an uprooting of Dasein from its own depths into its own 
heights. Love is indeed a falling, but it is a kind of falling which is not 
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falling-prey to inauthentic everydayness, but a falling-upon, as in, up 
towards the other and thus back-to oneself; it is a kind of falling-up-in-
love which allows for a kind of flight. This is to say that, in falling-in-to-
love, Dasein encounters its Self in the expanse of its possibilities.48  
Rilke also states that lovers must be guardians to each other’s 
solitudes. A guardian is one who guards, in the sense of protecting and 
preserving. A guardian defined as ‘one to whom the care and 
preservation of any thing is committed’ captures the caring solicitude as 
leaping-ahead of authentic Being-with in Heidegger’s sense.49 In his later 
essay, Building, Dwelling, Thinking, Heidegger gives an account of a certain 
understanding of preserve as being one of the meanings of ‘the free’ 
(German das Frye and fry).50 Preserving in this sense is a freeing of 
something by allowing it to Be what it is, for its self, and that means to 
tend, to cultivate or to help along, in such a way that does not stifle, but 
allows it to grow. Also relevant is that ‘guard’ is connected with ‘ward’ in 
old Germanic, in the sense of a watchman, or a guard keeping a look out 
in order to keep safe what it’s guarding.51 To ward is to keep watch 
carefully. To be a guardian of the other’s solitude is to keep watch of 
their solitude anticipatingly, and not merely curiously seeing it. That is, 
holding in sight the solitude of the other, and not leaping after it in 
‘leaping away’ curiosity. This is what lets the other Be in the sense of 
preserving which frees up. Overlooking the nature of Dasein as their own 
solitude tends to lead to the leaping-in modes of Being-with which comes 
with, although not necessarily, that comportment to the other that 
dominates. Although, more often, it leads to everyday indifference that is 
not open to the other. In Being-with in-love, lovers hold each other, as 
their own solitudes, in view so as to free up their potentiality-for-Being 
their own selves, as selves that are always, primordially, with the other in 
resoluteness as un-locked, that is, opened. 
The lack the lover finds in their self when desiring another 
misinterprets one’s ownmost nullity as being something lacking from 
their completed or whole self, and moreover, understanding their Self 
under ontic terms, and not those of existentiality. The crucial parallel 
here with Heidegger’s nullity and Carson’s account of the paradoxical 
arrest that occurs under the influence of eros, is the notion of coming to 
see the possibilities of what one can become. Possibilities are never 
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actual. In the palpable sense of the possible, one discovers a moment of 
one’s own Being. The reach becoming a longing will get one back to 
oneself by the very distance found in Belonging.  
All of this is not to say that love is tranquil, which would place it 
under the realm of everyday secureness. On the contrary, love is deeply 
unsettling; it is a profound uprooting of the certain sense of oneself in 
one’s everyday mode of existing. Falling in love is, indeed, an arousal 
which carries both of its ordinary notions of becoming sexually excited 
and of becoming awakened from sleep. Ontologically, love’s arousal 
stretches one’s Being from the familiar, asleep-like world of everydayness 
to the indefinable pure possibility of one’s authentic Being-with, and 
equally into one’s essential lack of ground. This is by no means a calm 
occurrence. The potential of love as Belonging also carries the possibility 
of devolving into a possessive desire. The torment of inauthentic desire 
occurs in the need to re-secure one’s uprooting (to ‘solve’ the paradox) 
and as such Dasein ‘flees in the face of’ itself. Acting upon this torment 
and need for a ground, the devolution of love falsely projects onto the 
other as the source of Dasein’s security and clings for the other in order 
to arrest, and to have them, or to have true knowledge of them. Yet with 
love, and as Stanley Cavell brought out more lucidly, we can never truly 
know another’s inner world, so-to-speak, nor understand their love for 
us, their pain, their happiness in the strict sense of ‘having a grasp on it,’ 
but we can acknowledge these in the other. Acknowledging is never 
knowing; it is, rather, the way of Being-with others that does not take 
hold over them, but releases them by way of seeing them, hearing them, 
and Being open to their Being there with you. In particular, to 
acknowledge, is a kind of giving the other thought. Thinking is related to 
thanking, etymologically.52 To thank the other is to express gratitude for 
something they have done or said—to give them thought—and this is an 
important sense of what we mean when we acknowledge one another. 
Love consists of thanking and giving careful thought to the other. 
 
8. Eros, Philia, and Innocent Desire 
τὸ φιλεῖν (philia) is defined in Aristotle’s Rhetoric as “wanting for someone 
what one thinks good, for his sake and not for one’s own, and being 
inclined, so far as one can, to do such things for him.”53 Love is an 
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encounter that eros forces upon one but manifests itself into philia. It has 
been said before that if love is to last, lovers must become friends. 
Nevertheless, eros is still a crucial component for love to endure not 
solely as friendly. That is, it can’t just stand in pure desire, nor can it end 
up as pure friendship if it is still to have the characteristics of love that is 
intimate. Love must be a kind of mix of the two. Eros and philia, when 
held together, give rise to a nurturing form of Being-with that takes into 
account both one’s desires and the selflessness of concern for the other. 
Philia better captures the sense of leaping-ahead and belonging that love 
has. It is a fondness and a responsive type of love; a kinship. Eros has that 
sense of reach and lack that can become a more authentic longing-for 
and standing in one’s own nullity. As was mentioned earlier, it is not 
obvious what kind of Being-with love or desire tend towards. While it is 
more evident that philia is a leaping-ahead, eros has a tendency of 
leaping-in (in its tormented reach), but can become a leaping-ahead. Eros 
guided by phila, however allows for a genuine leaping-ahead in-love. 
Authentic Being-in-love needs both the passion started up by eros’s reach 
and lack, as well as the kindness for-the-other’s-sake that philia brings. In 
the ‘moment’ of love, eros and philia interweave as a Nietzschean 
innocent desire. 
The notion of an innocent desire is brought up in ‘On Immaculate 
Perception’ in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, as a love of “creators, 
begetters, and enjoyers of becoming.” Those that desire with innocence 
want “to create over and beyond” themselves, which requires 
perishing.54 A love that goes beyond oneself goes beyond one’s ordinary 
self-understanding and secure sense of what one is. In love, lovers wants 
to become more than what they currently are, and in reaching for more, 
they inevitably must shed their foundations. Shedding one’s foundation 
not only means ridding oneself of the typologies imbued on oneself in 
everydayness, but also Being one’s null groundlessness.  
The creator’s innocent desire is encompassed by the heights and the 
depths of Nietzsche’s “solar love.”  
 
 
Look there, how she glides impatiently across the sea! Do you 
not feel her thirst and the hot breath of her love? She would 
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suck at the sea and drink its depths into herself in the heights; 
now the sea’s desire rises with a thousand breasts. It wants to be 
kissed and sucked by the thirst of the sun; it wants to become 
air and height and footpath of light and light itself!55 
 
 
In love, the heights and the depths are not encountered separately, 
as if one solely referred to the lover as the sun and the other solely to the 
beloved as the sea. As if one were always the giver and the other always 
the receiver. Rather, each Dasein is equally the sun and the sea, and they 
learn to become their own depths and heights in shared love. In part 
three, Zarathustra is speaking sorrowfully to his own soul about having 
given everything to it and now being empty. It responds, “Who of us is 
supposed to be thankful? -does the giver not have to give thanks that the 
receiver received? Is bestowing not a bare necessity? Is receiving not- 
mercy?” Crucially, Zarathustra is both his own giver and his own 
receiver. 
It is customary to place most attention on the side of the lover and to 
think that the lover is giving a gift while the beloved is something of a 
well where the lover is to dispel all that love into; that somehow, the 
beloved doesn’t have to do much except ‘give in.’ The receiver’s mercy 
for the bestower in love has a sense of giving in, but it is not one that is 
indifferent and merely letting it be overtaken and filled up. It is, instead, 
a kind of blessing, a forgiveness that grants love its flow outward in the 
first place. Forgiveness is a granting.56 Bestowing and receiving in love 
are not separate traits of different people, but features of love that are 
shared equally; in authentic love, a lover must also be a beloved, and vice 
versa. The depths of the sea and the heights of the sun are always one’s 
own. But being one’s own, existentially, also means that it is shared with 
others since Dasein’s basic constitution is part and parcel Being-with 
others. In love, belonging together is a shared loving and being loved; the 
heights and depths are equiprimordially considered one’s own and 
shared. The fashioned idea that there must be one lover and one beloved 
is embedded into the normative conceptions of not only patriarchal 
relationships but also monogamous ones. Authentic love only attends to a 
shared moment of Belonging between Daseins; it does not entail long 
term monogamy. Albeit, I will argue in the following section that it is 
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possible to be ‘in the long run’ for a shared love, which can manifest as 
an enduring relationship, but does not necessarily have to be this way. 
 
9. Falling Out 
“We need, in love, to practice only this: letting each other go. For holding on comes easily; we 
do not need to learn it.”      —Rainer Marie Rilke 57 
 
Love can leave. In its most difficult case, it is the complete falling out of 
love that (usually) comes with the end of a relationship. Falling out of 
love completely is painfully being dislodged from a place of belonging 
and being forced back into everyday ways of interaction with others that 
are leveled off, indifferent, and at the plain surface of Being-with. In the 
return to everyday Being-with, one notes that all things lack 
meaningfulness. Many times when a love relationship ends the sense of 
pointlessness to everyday life is overwhelming: one can hardly eat, colors 
lose their luster, one is indifferent and hardly ‘here’ when the other is not 
‘there’ to share the world with. 
Falling out of love, however, also inevitably occurs along with falling 
in-love. In a subtle way, falling out of love occurs in the intervals between 
the shared moments of Being-in-love. That is, one comes back to the 
everyday mode of existing with others, and this includes the other whom 
is loved. Everyday comportment with a lover, albeit different from 
comportment with office acquaintances or with parents for example, can 
lead to the stagnant state of not falling-back-in-love. The falling-in and 
falling-out ways of love are neither a deception nor a toying with 
another’s feelings. Ontologically speaking, everyday comportment is part 
of what allows for authentic comportment and vice versa. One must be 
open to falling-in again or being open to being uprooted again. The 
stagnation that one can reach is not the failure of love as a mood itself 
but part of the very essence of Dasein to fall back into the everyday mode 
of Being. This equally effects how Dasein is with others, since 
authenticity cannot be a permanent mode of Being. With our return to 
everydayness, we not only forget our authentic selves but that of our 
beloved as well. We come to view them in their plain surface level 
features of everyday life, indifferently and in a leveled-off manner and 
under societal types. This does not mean that we view them coldly nor 
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with malicious intent, but rather, with little concern for what they say or 
do. Moreover, in everydayness that distance opened up between solitudes 
in-love gets muddled. Love is work, in the sense that it needs to be 
continuously nurtured by way of one’s Self being-open for possibility, by 
leaping-ahead, and by acknowledging the other. Stagnancy comes from 
not Being-towards this sort of nourishment, and this is most evident in 
our regular way of speaking about past failed loves as unwilling to put the 
work into love. 
Love is falling in love over and over and over again58. This falling is 
not that of falling into everydayness, but falling towards belongingness 
with the other. The repetition of ‘over and over’ is not merely repetitive, 
but is an inevitable encountering of the possibility again. The possibility 
of a shared love is evidently no simple matter, and requires each Dasein 
to seize the day out of everydayness together. It is difficult since it is not 
solely reliant on oneself being open, leaping-ahead, and acknowledging 
the other, but it needs the other to also work on these ways of 
authentically Being-with in order to be open for the moment together; 
the rarity of this phenomenon cannot be overlooked. Staying open for 
the other, and for the possibility of coming-back-to each other in the 
occasional authentic moments shared, is what keeps lovers together, 
despite the inevitability of falling-out back to everydayness. While rare, 
love nevertheless motivates these comportments in each if lovers learn 
how to distinguish between leaping-in and leaping-ahead behaviors. 
Even in a complete falling-out of love (such as in a break up), Dasein 
can still move on in that it has found itself as essentially null in the 
process. That is, it has understood itself not as something that can be 
filled up by any other, but is its own potentiality for its Being. Great love 
gives each the possibility of finding their own way to becoming themself 
as pure possibilities. This gift in love, even after it has passed, is by no 
means a loss. Loss of love is not loss of self, which would imply being a 
present-at-hand entity that could be completed by the other.  
Great love, however long it lasts, sometimes calls for an end, as 
much as it called for the beginning, so as to bound it whole as a moment 
shared. This distinguishes love from the dispersive unending nature of 
everydayness. An end of a moment shared doesn’t mean it is decisive. 
Reunions are possibilities opened up after the fact, and must be possible 
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if love is to be something that one can be in the long run for. The 
beginning and end of shared authentic moments in love come back in 
new ways; this gives love its way of falling over and over again which 
allows authentic love to repeat (not redundantly), as momentarily arising 
as whole and honest in itself. This is possible, of course, until death 
decisively parts them, which is why love is deeply constituted by rebirth. 
 
10. Rebirth In-Love 
The ontological boundedness of Dasein consists of its birth and death. 
These poles hold Dasein in its ‘there,’ and gives way to its potentiality-
for-Being. Death, of course, plays a central theme in Heidegger’s 
ontology, specifically because death is what gives meaning to our deep 
finitude by way of anticipatory resoluteness. Given that birth and death 
are constitutive of Dasein, they always play crucial roles in any 
phenomena. Death cannot have more primacy with regards to Dasein’s 
boundedness than birth, nor vice versa. The possibility of death, which is 
certain, relies on Dasein’s having-been-born. That something is born 
means that it is dying. Viewed backwards, that something died means it 
was born and endured the process of becoming. Becoming requires a 
sense of birth throughout, that is, re-birth. 
Given love’s falling-in and falling-out character, it doesn’t seem like 
it is a confrontation with one’s possibility of death that impels one to 
come-back-to oneself, and to the other whom is loved, but rather, it 
seems that birth, as a rebirth, tends to guide one in love. Love illuminates 
ones birth. It tends to bring about a renewed sense of oneself and of the 
world. While anxiety impels one futurily, as a projection upon the utmost 
possibility of death, love arouses one from the falling of everydayness into 
the primordiality of shared possibility. The arousal of love is anew and 
filled with hope for what is to come. The primary sense of how one is in 
falling-in-love is that of a childlike sense of wonder in a new found 
possibility. In love, one finds oneself anew in the sense of an overflowing 
rebirth throughout this falling-in over and over with another. Rebirth 
bestows lovers with a sense of having found something remarkable in the 
other, and this childlike wonder for the other further comes with an 
honest playfulness that deeply enjoys this Being-with, as Nietzsche’s 
innocent desire.  
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Rebirth is a newfound self, which is always deeply familiar in that 
what is found is what one has always Been, yet has never truly 
undergone. Becoming one’s ownmost Self can feel like new when one has 
primarily been absorbed in everydayness, but it is never the kind of new 
that is associated with lively experiences like a concert or a performance. 
Rather, it is new in the sense of renewal; of coming back to something 
that has been unknowingly forgotten and finding new ways to interact 
with it. Put in another way, rebirth’s familiar new is that sense of when 
what is commonly dealt with suddenly takes on an enigmatical wondrous 
presence, seemingly for the first time but always with its ties to its original 
context. 
Being-in-love thus alters Being-in-the-world in this familiar new way. 
One’s comportment in the world takes on a heightened glee for 
everything encountered. This comportment manifests in the ways in 
which poets tend to express their love, in one’s sense of the brightness in 
colors, in the attuned ear to birds’ songs, and in that happy-step the lover 
takes on its paths; when in-love, all is radiant and agreeable. The world’s 
address to the lover is a welcomed and a pleasant one. It is as if all the 
sounds and sights are trying to speak to the lover. Responsively the lover 
is generous and greets all with bright eyes and warm gestures. The lover 
frees up the chains of everyday Being-with others and finds its own ability 
to Be-with others in a solicitous way. Thus, the world becomes 




I don’t mean to suggest a superficial cliché understanding of love as one 
that should avoid lust and pursue ‘pure love.’ Authentic love, the rebirth 
of a shared moment constituted by the entwinement of eros and philia, is 
being gathered with the other in the moment of a shared liberation. It is 
not possible to permanently be authentic, thus it is not possible to always 
be in this shared moment in-love. Indeed, Heidegger reiterates that 
“proximally and for the most part” we are in the mode of everydayness. 
But we also cannot always be in this undifferentiated mode either. It is in 
the nature of Dasein to ponder over its own Being and to be confronted 
by its existence. These are, however, rare moments, usually undergone 
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through anxiety, as Heidegger elaborated, or through love, as what I 
have tried to show. Both are not common everyday phenomena, even 
though our everyday talk tends to amass a plethora of differing 
experiences and distort them to fit into the meanings of anxiety and love, 
without ever distinguishing the experiences’ differing existential states of 
Being. While not common, it is important to open up the authentic areas 
of our Being-with one another. This mode will undoubtedly modify how 
we treat one another in favor of a more caring comportment. It can, for 
one, decrease our tolerance for being treated as a kind of tool or a step-
stone for others’ satisfaction. There are moments when authentic love 
can be experienced, and while it cannot be forced, one can be open to its 
happening. 
 
“For one human being to love another: that is perhaps the most difficult of all our tasks, the 
ultimate, the last test and proof, the work for which all other work is but preparation.” 
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